We are now just a scant six weeks away from the Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga scheduled for 21-22 May, which will "take stock" of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and perhaps provide a way forward for a policy that has been divisive both inside and outside of the European Union. The preparations for the Riga Summit, which were ongoing in EU institutions this week, happen in parallel with the debate on the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) review launched by the European Commission beginning of March. On Monday 13 April it will be considered in the European Parliament Foreign Affairs committee and on 14 and 16 April Council’s Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST) will discuss both EaP Summit and ENP review.
Eastern Partnership uneven success amongst its six “partners” (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) has led many to question the utility of keeping it, as well as the assumptions behind it.
Firstly, the idea of the six nations as partners to the EU and its member states is a misnomer, as it implies that all six were starting a race from the same starting point. In fact, the unevenness of this starting line has been the greatest weakness of the EaP, as it lumped together six very different countries with very different ideals and aspirations. The term partner also invokes the idea of equality, in that the partners were on equal footing with the EU. In reality, they were perceived in many quarters of the EU as requiring the EU’s assistance, guidance, and aid to help them “catch up,” as a stronger, wiser big brother or sister might help a younger sibling.
Three of the Eastern Partnership countries have used, and continue to use, the EU’s “helping hand” to integrate more fully into the Internal Market. Of course, this integration has not come without a price, the most obvious example being the conflict with Russia via Ukraine.
Georgia and Moldova have shown themselves to be on a path to adopting European standards and governance at some point. Nonetheless, the recent elections in both countries and their less-than-clear outcome have demonstrated that there is still great trepidation about closing the door completely on ties with Russia and its economy. Still, Moldova has avoided exacerbating the frozen conflict in Transnistria, preferring to use its increasing economic ties with the EU as the “carrot” to Russia’s stick.
Of the other three EaP countries, perhaps Armenia is the one which has most decidedly changed course in rebuffing an Association Agreement with the EU in favour of joining the Eurasian Economic Union.
Belarus, meanwhile, has never really left the starting line, while Azerbaijan is in a league of its own due to its status as the only credible alternative gas supplier for the Eastern part of Europe.
So what is the next step for the EaP? Well, clearly the review of the EaP must involve questioning the basic assumptions that underlie it before revamping it or, even more drastically, scrapping it entirely. This review must take into account what the EU wishes to achieve through such partnerships—are they economic? Political? Strategic? Of course, each of the six countries will be a differing combination of the three, and so it is worth considering developing a tailored approach for each of the six which takes into account their own aspirations. In this vein, the EU can be assured of greater success of its goals, while avoiding creating more tension with its neighbours.